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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
                     
 
No. 95-5180 
                     
 
 
THERESA LYN RYAN, An infant by her Guardian Ad Litem,  
ALBERTA CAPRIA-RYAN; GREGORY L. RYAN, JR., An infant 
by his Guardian Ad Litem, ALBERTA CAPRIA-RYAN; 
BRIGID RYAN, An infant by her Guardian Ad Litem, 
ALBERTA CAPRIA-RYAN; ALBERTA CAPRIA-RYAN, Individually; 
GREGORY L. RYAN, Individually 
 
v. 
 
FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, 
 
       Appellant 
 
                     
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 94-cv-01467) 
                     
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 25, 1996 
 
BEFORE:  COWEN and McKEE, Circuit Judges 
and POLLAK, District Judge* 
 
 
(Filed March 14, 1996) 
 
 
Leonard A. Wolkstein 
Gutterman, Wolkstein, Klinger & 
 Yohalem 
240 East Grove Street 
P.O. Box 2850 
Westfield, New Jersey  07091 
 
 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES 
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*Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior United States District Judge 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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Elizabeth C. Smith 
Federal Express Corporation 
1980 Nonconnah Boulevard 
3rd Floor 
Memphis, TN  38132 
 
 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
                     
 
OPINION 
                     
  
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 In this case we must decide the extent of the power of 
federal courts to develop federal common law in cases involving 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461.  Specifically, is such power sufficiently 
broad to permit the district court to override a subrogation 
provision in an ERISA-regulated plan on the ground that the plan 
would be unjustly enriched if it were to be enforced as written. 
In the instant case the district court granted the motion by 
Alberta, Gregory, Brigid and Theresa Ryan ("the Ryans") for 
summary judgment, ruling that appellant Federal Express--despite 
having paid the plaintiffs over $190,000.00 under the terms of 
its health plan before plaintiffs settled their malpractice 
claims--was not entitled to full reimbursement.  The district 
court ruled that the health plan's subrogation provision could 
not be given effect because Federal Express would receive an 
"unjust benefit" if it were not required to deduct from its 
subrogation lien a pro rata share of the attorneys' fees that the 
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plaintiffs had incurred in obtaining their malpractice 
settlement. 
 In granting the Ryans' motion for summary judgment, the 
district court failed to articulate how its effective revision of 
the terms of the Federal Express Plan served to validate an 
important statutory policy of ERISA.  Such a determination is a 
necessary antecedent to overriding an express provision of a 
benefits plan within the purview of ERISA.  Because the district 
court interpreted the authority of federal courts to develop 
federal common law under ERISA too broadly, we will reverse the 
February 
15, 1995, order of the district court granting the Ryans summary 
judgment
.       
 
       I. 
 Alberta Capria-Ryan and Gregory L. Ryan are employees of 
Federal Express.  Theresa Lyn Ryan is their infant daughter.  The 
Ryans are beneficiaries under the Federal Express Group Health 
Plan 
("the Plan"), which is a self-funded employee welfare benefit 
plan within the meaning of ERISA.  29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).   
 Article 11, Section 11.2 of the Plan provides, in relevant 
part, that "[e]ach Covered Participant shall be deemed 
conclusively to have agreed to and accepted the terms and 
conditions of the Plan when he becomes a Covered Participant."  
App. at 192.  The Plan also contains a subrogation/reimbursement 
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clause which requires full reimbursement of all benefits paid by 
the Plan if the amount of a covered employee's net recovery 
exceeds the amount of benefits paid by the Plan.  Article 8, 
Section 8.5 of the Plan provides in pertinent part that 
if benefits are paid on account of an illness resulting 
from the intentional actions or from the negligence of 
a third party, the Plan shall have the right to 
recover, against any source which makes payments or to 
be reimbursed by the Covered Participant who receives 
such benefits, 100% of the amount of covered benefits 
paid. (Subrogation in connection with the Insured 
Options shall be governed by the provisions of those 
Options.)  If the 100% reimbursement provided above 
exceeds the amount recovered by the Covered 
Participant, less legal and attorney's fees incurred by 
the Covered Participant in obtaining such recovery (the 
Covered Participant's "Net Recovery"), the Covered 
Participant shall reimburse the Plan the entire amount 
of such Net Recovery. 
 
Id. at 185-86 (emphasis added).  Similarly, pages fifty-five and 
fifty-six of Your Employee Benefits, the summary plan 
description, entitled "SUBROGATION (THIRD-PARTY RESPONSIBILITY)," 
provide that 
[i]f your illness or injury is caused by the actions of 
a third party, payment of your expenses is the 
responsibility of that third party.  If you receive any 
payment from the third party, the Company expects 100% 
reimbursement for any plan benefits paid.  However, if 
the payment you receive from the third party, less your 
attorneys' fees and other legal expenses, is not enough 
to reimburse benefit payments at 100%, you must 
reimburse the plan 100% of what is left after paying 
your attorneys' fees and other legal expenses. 
 
Id. at 293.  The Ryans do not claim that Federal Express made any 
representations to them about the requirements of the subrogation 
provision other than those expressly set forth in the Plan.  
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 The Ryans applied for benefits under the Plan after Mrs. 
Ryan gave birth to Theresa Ryan.  Theresa Ryan was born on 
October 5, 1989, afflicted with cerebral palsy and severe brain 
damage.  On February 27, 1991, the Ryans filed a malpractice 
action in the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, Union 
County.  Before the Ryans recovered any money from the parties 
named in their malpractice action, they obtained over $190,000.00 
under the Plan. The Ryans' malpractice case ultimately settled on 
January 18, 1994. The Ryans' recovery under the settlement 
agreement totaled $1,486,357.67.  Of that sum, the Ryans' lawyers 
were awarded $273,635.77 in attorneys' fees, which amounted to 
18.4% of the settlement award. 
 After the settlement was finalized, Federal Express asserted 
a subrogation lien against the Ryans' recovery for $191,793.65. 
The Ryans offered to pay only part of the subrogation lien, 
insisting that they be permitted to subtract a pro rata share of 
counsel fees they had incurred (18.4% of $273,635.77, or 
$35,290.03) in pursuing their malpractice claims in state court. 
Federal Express rejected the Ryans' proposal, asserting that the 
Plan unambiguously required the Ryans to remit the entire 
$191,793.65 because their net recovery far exceeded this amount.   
 On March 18, 1994, the Ryans filed a complaint in state 
court, in which they sought a judgment directing Federal Express 
to pay a pro rata share of their attorneys' fees.  The Ryans 
contended that they were entitled under state law to deduct a pro 
rata share of reasonable attorneys' fees from the subrogation 
lien and that Federal Express was prohibited from denying them 
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benefits of any kind under the terms of the Plan.  On March 30, 
1994, Federal Express removed the case to the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1441. 
 Both parties moved for summary judgment and the Ryans' 
arguments prevailed.  The district court refused to enforce the 
Plan's subrogation clause, finding that the implementation of 
this provision would confer an "unjust benefit" upon Federal 
Express. App. at 25.  Since ERISA is silent on the issue of 
subrogation agreements, the district court looked to common law 
principles to provide plaintiffs with the remedy it fashioned.  
In so doing, the court established a new federal common law right 
of recovery under ERISA;  i.e., a right under federal common law 
to deduct from a subrogation lien a pro rata share of attorneys' 
fees incurred in pursuing a claim, despite explicit contrary 
language in the Plan's subrogation clause.  Federal Express 
appeals the order of the district court granting summary judgment 
in favor of the Ryans. 
 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The 
district court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 1132.  Our review of the order of the 
district court granting the Ryans' motion for summary judgment is 
plenary. Bixler v. Central Pennsylvania Teamsters Health & 
Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1297 (3d Cir. 1993).  Motions for 
summary judgment must be granted if "there is no genuine issue as 
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to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  As there 
are no material facts in dispute, the disposition of this case 
rests upon whether the district court was empowered to tailor a 
common-law rule under ERISA to cover this situation. 
 
III. 
 ERISA requires that all employee benefit plans be 
"established and maintained pursuant to a written instrument,"  
29 U.S.C. §1102(a)(1), and that plan administrators act 
consistently with the Plan's written terms.  Plan fiduciaries 
must discharge their "duties with respect to a plan solely in the 
interests of the participants and beneficiaries and . . . in 
accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan 
. . . ."  Id. §1104(a)(1)(D).  It is uncontroverted that the Plan 
met the requirements of ERISA.  It is also undisputed that the 
Plan administrators did not violate their fiduciary 
responsibilities. 
 It is well established that federal courts have the power 
under appropriate circumstances to apply common-law doctrines in 
ERISA actions.  The Supreme Court has instructed federal courts 
"to develop a `federal common law of rights and obligations under 
ERISA-regulated plans' . . . guided by principles of trust law."  
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110, 109 S. 
Ct. 948, 954 (1989) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 
U.S. 41, 56, 107 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 (1987)).  See also Heasley v. 
Belden & Blake Corp., 2 F.3d 1249, 1257 n.8 (3d Cir. 1993) 
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("Firestone authorizes the federal courts to develop federal 
common law to fill gaps left by ERISA.").  In deciding whether it 
is appropriate to apply principles of federal common law, "the 
inquiry is whether the judicial creation of a right . . . is 
`necessary to fill in interstitially or otherwise effectuate the 
statutory pattern enacted in the large by Congress.'"  Plucinski 
v. I.A.M. Nat'l Pension Fund, 875 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(citations omitted).  We have admonished district courts that 
they "should not easily fashion additional ERISA claims and 
parties outside congressional intent under the guise of federal 
common law." Curcio v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 
226, 235 (3d Cir. 1994).  As the Supreme Court has explained, 
"[t]he authority of courts to develop a `federal common law' 
under ERISA . . . is not the authority to revise the text of the 
statute."  Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, ___, 113 S. 
Ct. 2063, 2070 (1993).   The Supreme Court has held that "ERISA 
does not create any substantive entitlement to employer-provided 
health benefits or any other kind of welfare benefits.  Employers 
or other plan sponsors are generally free under ERISA, for any 
reason at any time, to adopt, modify, or terminate welfare 
plans."  Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, ___ U.S. ___, 
___, 115 S. Ct. 1223, 1228 (1995). As we stated in Hamilton v. 
Air Jamaica, Ltd., 945 F.2d 74, 78 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 
503 U.S. 938, 112 S. Ct. 1479 (1992), "[w]hile ERISA was enacted 
to provide security in employee benefits, it protects only those 
benefits provided in the plan. . . . `ERISA mandates no minimum 
substantive content for employee welfare benefit plans, and 
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therefore a court has no authority to draft the substantive 
content in such plans.'"  (quoting Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 748 
F.2d 1348, 1353 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865, 106 
S. Ct. 183 (1985)).  Furthermore, notwithstanding "the ennobling 
purposes which prompted passage of ERISA, courts have no right to 
torture language in an attempt to force particular results . . . 
the contracting parties never intended or imagined. To the exact 
contrary, straightforward language . . . should be given its 
natural meaning."  Burnham v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 873 
F.2d 486, 489 (1st Cir. 1989).  See Singer v. Black & Decker 
Corp., 964 F.2d 1449, 1452 (4th Cir. 1992) ("[R]esort to federal 
common law generally is inappropriate when its application would 
. . . threaten to override the explicit terms of an established 
ERISA benefit plan."). 
 In Van Orman v. American Insurance Co., 680 F.2d 301 (3d 
Cir. 1982), we discussed the question of what showing a party 
(who would otherwise be bound by the language of the controlling 
benefits plan) must make in order to establish a viable federal 
common-law right premised upon unjust enrichment.  Van Orman 
involved a dispute over who was entitled to obtain an actuarial 
surplus of approximately $12,000,000.00 upon the termination of a 
benefits plan.  The plan provision specifically provided that the 
employer "shall be entitled to the net assets of the Trust Fund 
which shall remain by reason of the erroneous actuarial 
computation during the life of the plan."  Id. at 304.  When the 
plan was finally terminated, the employer sought to enforce its 
right to obtain the actuarial surplus.  The covered employees 
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objected, arguing that a number of booklets and letters that they 
had received from their employer had indicated that any actuarial 
surplus would be held in trust for the employees and would become 
their property upon the termination of the plan. 
 In the ensuing litigation the Van Orman plaintiffs asserted, 
inter alia, that if defendants were permitted to retain the 
actuarial surplus, as provided by the plan, they would be 
unjustly enriched.  The district court found, however, that any 
contrary representations that had been made in the booklets and 
letters sent to the plaintiff employees were not binding upon 
defendants, and hence not part of the plan, because they had 
contained disclaimers asserting that only the actual plan 
document was to govern the rights of employees.  We affirmed the 
finding of the district court that the booklets and letters were 
not part of the plan document. Id. at 306-07.  Since the plan 
expressly provided that the employer was entitled to the entire 
actuarial surplus, we concluded that "the doctrine of unjust 
enrichment is inapplicable under New Jersey law and as a matter 
of federal common law. . . [because] recovery under unjust 
enrichment may not be had when a valid, unrescinded contract 
governs the rights of the parties."  Id. at 310. 
 In rejecting the plaintiffs' argument in Van Orman that the 
case warranted the application of federal common law, we 
described the heavy burden that plaintiffs must satisfy in order 
to nullify a bargained-for plan provision on the ground of unjust 
enrichment. The court observed that 
12 
[w]here Congress has established an extensive 
regulatory network and has expressly announced its 
intention to occupy the field, federal courts will not 
lightly create additional rights under the rubric of 
federal common law. . . . We are particularly reluctant 
to fashion a federal common-law doctrine of unjust 
enrichment when such a right would override a 
contractual provision. . . . The existence of a 
contract . . . requires a particularly strong 
indication that the unjust enrichment doctrine will 
vindicate an important statutory policy. . . . 
[D]espite the extensive regulatory scheme governing 
pension plans, Congress left many matters to the 
discretion of the parties.  The Supreme Court has 
emphasized the primacy of plan provisions absent a 
conflict with the statutory policies of ERISA. 
 
Id. at 312-13.  Accord Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare, & 
Pension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d 1176, 1186 (3d Cir. 1991);  cf. 
Hamilton, 945 F.2d at 78 (ERISA's disclosure provisions "permit[] 
employees to bargain further or seek other employment if they are 
dissatisfied with their benefits.").   
 As with many other substantive terms of welfare plans, ERISA 
says nothing about subrogation provisions.  ERISA neither 
requires a welfare plan to contain a subrogation clause nor does 
it bar such clauses or otherwise regulate their content.  See 
Land v. Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse Workers Union 
(Independent) Health and Welfare Fund, 25 F.3d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 
1994).  The language of the subrogation provision at issue here 
unambiguously requires the Ryans to pay back all the money they 
received from the Plan.  Since the Ryans have failed to establish 
that the Plan "conflict[s] with the statutory policies of ERISA" 
and have similarly failed to show that the common law right at 
issue "is necessary to . . . effectuate a statutory policy,"  Van 
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Orman, 680 F.2d at 312-13, we must reject the Ryans' attempt to 
establish the common law right they would have us recognize. 
 The Ryans' argument that the Plan would be unjustly enriched 
if it was not required to pay a pro rata share of their 
attorney's fees is entirely without merit.  "Enrichment is not 
`unjust' where it is allowed by the express terms of the . . . 
plan."  Cummings v. Briggs & Stratton Retirement Plan, 797 F.2d 
383, 390 (7th Cir.) (citing Craig v. Bemis Co., 517 F.2d 677, 684 
(5th Cir. 1975)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1008, 107 S. Ct. 648 
(1986).  Indeed, it would be inequitable to permit the Ryans to 
partake of the benefits of the Plan and then, after they had 
received a substantial settlement, invoke common law principles 
to establish a legal justification for their refusal to satisfy 
their end of the bargain. 
 
IV.  
 The subrogation provision at issue must be enforced as 
written and requires that the disputed funds be remitted to 
Federal Express.  The February 15, 1995, order of the district 
court will be reversed and this matter remanded to the district 
court with instructions to enter an order granting the cross-
motion of Federal Express for summary judgment.                    
 
